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Evidentiary Privilege for Hospital Quality Assurance art
Risk Management: Assessing Statutory Refonn* .
Introduction
Quality assurance (QA) and risk management (RM) programs origin~
~ela~iv~ly recently in Canadian h.ospitals.t Associated wit~ the increa:sili&l~
institutional framework for the delivery of health care, 2 their developmellt1tias
been stimulated by tougher standards for hospital accreditation.' the expa~'dCd
* I am indebted to the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation
Is~u~s in He~th Care, by whom I was employed during 198? -88, and for whom this N~te,was
originally wntten. The VIews expressed are, however, exclusively my own. '.
I. G. Richard Batty, "Quality Assurance - What Lies Ahead? A Canadian Legal Respective"
(1985) 5 Health Law in Canada 108. The Canadian Council on Hospital Accreditation:
(C.C.H.A.) traces the appearance of patient care appraisal in Canada to the 1970s: C.C.H~
"Position on Patient Care Appraisal" (September 1985). These developments appear to tiave
been predated slightly by the emergence of quality assurance and risk managementpro~
in the United States. See, e.g., John Ball, "PSRO - An Alternative to the Medical MalpractiCe
System as a Quality Assurance Mechanism" (1977) 36 Maryland L. Rev.566.:.
2. See, e.g., Ellen Picard, "The Liability of Hospitals in Common Law Canada" (1981) 26j~
McGill LJ. 997 at 998, 100I. According to a 1984 study, roughly 60 percent of the Ameiican
population had no personal physician and therefore placed primary reliance on hospitaldo~
medical care: Diane Janulis and Alan Hornstein, "Damned If You Do, Damned If YouDon't
Hospitals' Liability for Medical Malpractice" (1985) 64 Neb. L. Rev. 689 at 692. further-'
more, the estimate that over 80 percent of all medical malpractice claims closed in 1984'.
involved an injury arising in a hospital setting confirms the extent to which the hospitalis
the centre of the contemporary health care system. See U.S. Congress General Accounting
Office, Medical Malpractice: Characteristics ofClaimsClosedin 1984 (Washington, D.C.:.,
GAO/HRD-87-55, April 1987) at 24-25. .
3. The C.C.H.A. is a voluntary program to which roughly half of Canadian hospitals (repreSent
ing 80 percent of hospital beds) subscribed in 1979: J.E. Magnet, "Preventing MedicalMil-
practice in Hospitals: Perspectives from Law and Policy" (1979) 3 Leg. Med. Q. 197. .'
C.C.H.A. Guidelines were amended in January 1983 to require of all hospitals aspiringto:a
three-year accreditation status that "[a] quality assIirance programme that includes effi
mechanisms for review and evaluating patient care, as well as responding appropriately
findings, shall be established, supported and maintained." Cited in Batty, supra,note I a
In the United States, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (J.C.A.H.) stipt
that accredited hospitals must "establish, maintain, and support through the hospital's.. ,
istration and medical staff, an ongoing quality assurance program that includes effecti
mechanisms for reviewing and evaluating patient care, as well as an appropriate respoi
such findings." J.C.A.H. Manual, cited in B. Abbott Goldberg, "The Peer Review Privil~ge:
Law in Search of a Policy" (1984) 10 Am. J. Law & Med. 151. See also the brief historto~
the lCAH. in Reid F. Holbrook, and Lee J. Dunn, Jr., "Medical Malpractice Litigation:cJ1ie
Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' Quality Assurance Committee Records" (1976) 16-
Washburn L.l 54 at 57-58, and the review of J.C.A.H. standards in Neil L. Chayet and·J1i
mas M. Reardon, "Trouble in the Medical Staff: A Practical Guide to Hospital Initiated'Qu
ity Assurance" (1981) 7 Am. J. Law & Med. 301 at 305. '
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tpe of hospital liability for medical malpractice' and direct government
c.. . 5 .
egulauon. _
~Vhile these measures promise substantial advancement in patient safety and
~~,quality of medical care, considerable concern has been voiced that their
. potential is fr~strated by the unwill.ingness of medical personnel to partic~p~te
lioleheartedly m such programs without clear guarantees of confidentiality
trthe deliberations and recommendations of QA and RM committees."
~tnsequently, it has been suggested that such communication should be shielded
in subsequent public disclosure." Indeed, statutory protection to this effect
a§iexisted in Manitoba since 1965 and in Alberta since 1970,8 and has also
1ie~n adopted in most American jurisdictions." More recently, evidentiary
.s·
£While American jurisdictions are considerably more advanced in this respect (accounting, in
";part, for the earlier ap~ear~nc~?f 9A and RM in t~e United States~, a noticeable tren~
'c':: towardexpanded hospital liability IS also apparent In Anglo-Canadian law. See, e.g., Picard,
'::supra, note 2; Dr. S.M. Kolber, "Toward the Finding of Greater Hospital Liability (part 1)"
";:(1984) 4 Health Law in Canada 72; David G. Duff; "The Liability of Doctors and Hospitals:
f.Developments in the Common Law" (July 1987) Research Paper for the Federal/Provincial!
2'Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in Health Care, at 66-78. As a
'-';result, although the Ontario Court of Appeal in Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital
·:'(1980), 110 D.L.R (3d) 513 (Ont. C.A.) disavowed the "corporate liability" doctrine of Dar-
L:tingv. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill. 2d 326,211 N.E. 2d 253, cert. denied,
~> 383 U.S. 946 (1966), Canadian hospitals could probably be held liable under existing Anglo-
'j: Canadian doctrine for injuries resulting from a failure to establish and maintain an effective
Of QA and RM program. See Magnet, supra,note 3 at 201. On U.S. law with respect to hospital
cdiability, see Arthur F. Southwick, "Hospital Liability: Two Theories Have Been Merged"
.~!(1983) 4 1. Leg. Med 1; Janulis and Hornstein, supra,note 2.
S:Magnet, supra, note 3 at 201. See, e.g., RRO. 1980, Reg. 865 (pursuant to the Public Hospi-
'" tals Act, RS.O. 1980, c. 410), requiring hospital boards to establish credentials, records, tissue
} and/or medical audit committees [so 7(l)(e)], as well as a more general "medical advisory
/ committee" [so 7(l)(b)-(d)] to supervise the practice of medicine in the hospital [so 7(6)(b)]
:/;and to make recommendations regarding the quality of medical care provided in the hospital
.s[s. 7(6)(vii)],particularly with respect to staff appointments and hospital privileges [so
-/;7(6)(a)(i)-(iii), (vi)]. More specifically, additional regulations adopted in November 1976 [0.
i--Reg. 934/76, S. 1] require each hospital board to "develop an accident prevention policy" [so
"Y4(a)], to appoint an "accident prevention committee" [so 4(c)], to meet regularly and make
;\recommendations concerning implementation of the policy [so 4(d)] and to "ensure the estab-
.Iishment of procedures designed to encourage (i) a safe work environment, (ii) safe work
'!'practicesand (iii) the prevention of accidents to patients, employees, professional staff and
:';visitors" [so 4(b)]. Several American states require hospitals to implement risk management
~programs as a condition of licensure. See U.S. Congress General Accounting Office, Medical
'::Malpractice' A Framework for Action(Washington D.C.: GAO/HRD-87-73, May 1987) at 17.
6!fSee, e.g.,Chayet and Reardon, supra,note 3 at 306-07; Batty, supra, note 1 at 110-11.
!Jbid. See also infra, notes 10, 13 and 14.
8~Evidence Act,RS.M. 1970, C. E-150, s. 11; Evidence Act,RSA 1980, c. A-21, S. 9.
~iArthur F. Southwick and Debora A. Slee, "Quality Assurance in Health Care: Confidentiality
}ifInformation and Immunity for Participants" (1984) 5 1. Leg. Med 343 at 359; Goldberg,
,supra, note 3 at 153-54. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat., s. 12-43.5-102(3)(e); Fla. Stat., s. 768.40(4)
~J(l981); Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. lIO, ss. 8-2101 to 8-2105 (Smith-Hurd 1984); Ky. Rev. Stat, s.
)11.377(2) (1983); Md. Health Code Ann., s. 134(A)(d) (1980); N.Y. Educ. Law, s. 6527(3)
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privilege for the quality assurance and risk management process has
onto the legislative agenda of most Canadian jurisdictions with a Canadi
Association resolution in August 1985,10 amendments to the evidence actS
British Columbia and Nova Scotia in 1986 and 1987,11 a bill currently:':: D
the New Brunswick legislature'? and recommendations for similar meas
Ontario, Quebec and Saskatchewan.'? _-
While widespre~dsupport among b~thmedical and non-medical comm~niti
suggests the relatively uncontroversial nature of such statutory protectlo
careful examination reveals several issues demanding cautious leiisla'
treatment. This comment advances specific recommendations for statuto
protection of the quality assurance and risk management process by revi6' .
the current basis for evidentiary disclosure.i> exploring the reasons for evidertti
privilege generally's and in the context of QA and RM,17 and applyin'
analysis to the design of a specific statutory rule to protect certain cat
of QA and RM information from disclosure during malpractice actions.n
DefiningTerms
At the outset, it is important to explain the terms "quality assurance" an
(McKinney 1971, amended 1977); Ohio Rev. Code Ann., s. 2305.25 (page 1981); Or.Re
Stat., s. 41.675(2) (981); 63 Pa. C.S.A., ss. 425.2 et seq.(1980); Tenn. Code Ann., s. 6~t2
2190967, amended 1983); Tex. Stat. Ann., art. 4447 (d), s. 3 (Vernon 1976); Vt. Stat Nom
Tit. 26, ss. 1441-43 (976); Va. Code Ann., ss. 8.01-581.16, 8.01-581.17 0977, amended.
1981); Wis. Stat. Ann., s. 146.38 (West Supp.1982)."
10. Canadian Bar Association, Resolution No.9 09 August 1985). ,
11. Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 116, s. 57(4) [as am. 1986]; Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1967/c.
s. 56AO)(a) [as am. 1987, c. 20]. . ,;
12. Bill 23, An Act to Amend theEvidence Act, New Brunswick, 36 Eliz. II, 1987, s. 43.3(3)(6).
13. See, e.g., Batty, supra,note 1 at Ill; Ontario Hospital Association (O.H.A.), "Patient C~
Review in Hospitals: Hospitals Call for Changes to the Ontario Evidence Act" (May 198 .
Association des hopitaux du Quebec (A.H.Q.), Memoire presente a la Commission dela'cif
chargee d'etudierleRapportsur la miseen oeuvrede la Loi sur L'acces(February 1988);,Wor
ing Group Respecting the Quality Assurance Process and The Saskatchewan EVidenceAer,
"Memorandum Re: Statutory Protection of the Quality Assurance Process" (9 Februaryf
1988), [hereinafter Saskatchewan Working Group, "Memorandum"]. ,:'
14. Advocates include the Canadian Council on Hospital Accreditation (C.C.H.A.), the Cli,
Bar Association (C.B.A.), the Canadian Medical Association (C.M.A.), the Ontario Hos
Association (O.H.A.), the Association des hopitaux du Quebec (A.H.Q.), the Canadian'f
Association (C.N.A.), the Saskatchewan Working Group, as well as the Governments of
ish Columbia, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Supra,notes 1, 10 and 13;C.M.A. Reso, U 0
(20 August 1985); C.N.A. "Brief to the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on LiabilifY. an
Compensation Issues in Health Care" (July 1988) at 28-29, [hereinafter C.N.A. Brien.~
15. Infra, notes 30-72 and accompanying text. c?
16. Infra,notes 42-51,85-100 and accompanying text
17. Infra, notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
18. Infra,notes 101-40 and accompanying text.
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D~
}~ent." Most generally, each involves the organization of institutional
Ismsfor assessing and improving the quality of medical care.
"eformer,this comprises the development of norms, standards and criteria
itor the quality of structural inputs to the delivery of health care, the
':6fmedical care and the [mal outcome of medical treatment.l? and the
"hment of programs and procedures "designed to assist practitioners in
'g' practice behavior found to be deficient by quality assessment, to
,,'the public against incompetent practitioners, as well as to modify
cJal or resource deficiencies that may exist."20 Broadly conceived, there-
'hality assurance encompasses the entire spectrum of medical regulatory
~s: from standards of professional licensure and hospital accreditation
'. a laid down by hospital credentials committees to systems of peer review,
"audit, utilization review, tissue and death review, and incident reports
;;'ally, to continuing medical education, mandatory relicensure and pro-
. ,cat discipline.
:'of the quality assurance process thus defined, risk management is
eless distinguishable in its primary emphasis on medical outcomes and
i!.'ility implications of adverse results of medical care." Specifically, risk
ement involves an integrated system for the identification of unexpected
c;om~s and risks causing or having the potential to cause medical (iatrogenic)
":or the impairment of patient safety;22 the centralization of data on all
. entified risks; the communication of this statistical information to other
'and administrative departments, and to quality assurance and credentials
ttees; the organization of educational programs to minimize the risk of
,patients; the development ofspecific programs tailored to the individual
s . :iion to address high risk clinical areas such as "operating suite, labor and
J{,o.
'"")-'"
i'
S~e.e.g.•Avedis Donabedian, A Guideto Medical CareAdministration, Volume II Medical
efir.eAppraisal- Quality and Utilization (1969) at 14-4l.
O. ~nierican Medical Association (A.M.A) Council on Medical Service, "Guidelines for Quality
~~urance" (1988) 259 lAMA 2572. See also A.M.A. Council on Medical Service, "Qual-
iiY.:9fCare" (1986) 256 lAMA 1032.
Seegenerally.American Society of Healthcare Risk Management (AS.H.R.M.) Legislative
j!skForce, "Model Language for a Healthcare Risk Management Program" (February
.~7).See also Richard Stock, "Risk Management Minimizing Errors and Liability" (Febru-
D!t1986) Dimensions in Health Service at 22.
~~lJrding to the AS.H.R.M.•this system of identification "can utilize and include", but is not
• ..I~ed to criteria based on outcome studies; monitoring systems based on objective criteria;
c~~.ent reports; patient grievances (e.g. written complaint letters relating to quality of care
~es); committee reports and minutes including quality assurance, credentialing, peer
"lc.:.w: morbidity and mortality; legal complaints and suits; "third party" reports by hospital
~cc~editation committees, governmental licensure agencies and professional disciplinary bod-
es-iEases referred to the medical examiner/coroner; outside requests for medical records, x-
~,o~ laboratory reports; security or police reports; and nursing, administrative and/or
a lIIJ.mstrator-on-call reports. AS.H.RM., "Model Language," supra,note 21 at 2.
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delivery, emergency department and anesthesia't.P and the review of rem
action by a "facilities risk manager" charged with the' task of implementing
coordinating and effectuating the risk management program.> .?
The obvious advantages of quality assurance and risk management for mediciiil
care and patient safety, professional excellence and the public image of the heait
care facility have encouraged most Canadian hospitals to institute such progratn
voluntarily'< As mentioned earlier, 26 however, this voluntary compliance wim
C.C.H.A. Guidelines has also been animated by external compulsion posed;l)y,
the risk of civil liability-? and by direct government regulation.v As a restll
as the ~ntario Hospital Association. o~serves: "There is a l~gal responsibili~
for hospital boards to ensure that policies and procedures are In place to revi~Vl
the quality of patient care and the utilization of hospital resources."29
Legal Basis of Compellability
The Ontario Evidence Act stipulates that
[a]ny writing or record made of any act, transaction, occurrence or eventIs.a
admissible as evidence of such act, transaction, occurrence or event if made in~:
the usual and ordinarycourseof anybusinessand if it was in the usualand ordinaryji
. course of such business to make such writing or record at the time of such act, (
transaction,occurrenceor event or withina reasonable time thereafter.30 '
Similar provisions can be found in the evidence acts of most other Canadiiit
jurisdictions)! To the extent that a medical injury is likely to trigger an internal
hospital investigation in the form of peer review or medical audit, and sin&
such quality assurance programs are now customary at Canadian hospitals,3f
23. Ibid. at 3.
24. Ibid. at l.
25. C.C.H.A. "Position on Patient Care Appraisal", supra,note 1 at 2.
26. Supra,notes 3-5 and accompanying text
27. Supra,note 4.
28. Supra,note 5.
29. O.H.A., "Patient Care Review in Hospitals", supra,note 13 at l.
30. Evidence Act,RS.O. 1980, c. 145, s. 35(2).
31. See, e.g., Evidence Ordinance, RO.N.W.T. 1974, c. E-4, s. 38; Evidence Act,RS.P.E.l 1974,c~
E-lO, s. 31.1(2) [as am. 1983, c. 13]; The Saskatchewan Evidence Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. S-16,s.'.
31(2);Evidence Ordinance, R.O.Y.T. 1971, c. E-6, s. 38(2). i.
32. Supra,note 25 and accompanying text.
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resulting information and evaluation would be admissible in a medical
'''ractice action.33~e these provisions constrain potential plaintiffs to evidence concerning
We'aIlegedly ne~ligent event alone, a ~roader power of compellability i~ av~able
'l:>ugh provincl~ court rules r~~ardmg documentary and oral ex~nun.atton for
ts:covery. Ontano's Rules of ewd Procedurew for example, require disclosure
of4riformation "relating to a~ymatter in ~s.sue" in the le~al action." ?fnineteenth
ertturY origin, this expression has traditionally been mterpreted in very broad
cerirts.36 In a malpractice action against an individual physician, it could include
gulility assurance criteria to assess quality of care, factual accounts of adverse
outcomes, incident reports, medical audit and peer review to assess the
l:I~fendant's overall pattern of practice.>? In a lawsuit alleging the hospital's
llkbility, in addition to the factual details of the patient's injury and incident
ieports, it could also involve input standards for hospital equipment and
p'ersonnel, utilization rev~e~, .and RM for high risk areas and details of risk
"anagementefforts to rmmrmze them.
"Under Ontario's Rules, on the other hand, oral examination for discovery is
~vailable as a right only with respect to parties "adverse in interest"38 Therefore,
~hile an officer of a defendant hospital could be compelled to answer questions
cbnceming the operation of QA and RM programs.t? a defendant physician
aould oppose examination of a member of a peer review or medical audit
cbmmittee on the grounds that the latter is not adverse in interest to the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, since the court may grant the plaintiff leave to examine "anyperson
1:~; .
'1'-."
<33. See, e.g., Hamulka v. Golfman (1985),20 D.L.R. (4th) 540 (Man. C.A.); DeSousa v. Kuntz, 28
.:' . September 1987, Vancouver Registry No. C854385 (B.C.S.C.); Finley v. University Hospital
, Board, (1987] 2 W.W.R. 40 (Sask. Q.B.) [hereinafter Finley]; Handler v, Spetaro (1988), unre-
ported decision no. 264497/86 (Ont, Dist, Ct) (Mandel J.). For an American decision to the
same effect, see Kaiser v. South Wassau Communities Hosp., 58 A.D. 2d 643, 396 N.Y.S. 2d
54 (1977).
';<34. Pursuant to the CourtsofJustice Act, 1984, S.O. 1984, c. 11, s. 90.
; '35. Rules ofCivilProcedure, O. Reg. 560/84 (Gaz, 22/9184) [am. O. Reg. 786/84 (Gaz. 291121
,- 84)). Rules 30.02(1), 31.06(1). Similar rules in Saskatchewan and Alberta refer to informa-
tion "touching the matters in question" in the action. See Czuy v. Mitchell (1976),72 D.L.R.
(3d) 424 (Alta. c.A.). In the United States, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
grants a broad right of discovery of all information relevant to the subject matter of the legal
action upon a showing of good cause, and provided the information sought is not otherwise
, privileged.
~_36. See, e.g.,Compagnie Financiere et Commerciale du Pacifique v. Peruvian Guano Co. (1882),
,y', 11 Q.B.D. 55 (C.A.).
;37. See, e.g., Berqwitz v. Fast (1980), 108 D.L.R. (3d) 732 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter Berqwitz]; F. v.
".. A Psychwtrist (1984), 53 B.C.L.R. 216,54 B.C.L.R. 319 (S.C.); A.G.B.C. v. Messier (1984),8
c;. . D.L.R. (4th) 306 (B.C.S.C,).
;:,38. Rules ofCivilProcedure, supra,note 35, Rule 31.03(1).
::39. Ibid., Rule 31.03(2).
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who there is reason to believe has information relevant to a material issue.:'
the action,"40 this obstacle is relatively easy to surmount. .,}n
Protection may nonetheless be available under statutory and common 19~
rules of privilege. Thus, for example, Ontario's Rules provide that a defenda'lit
may resist demands for the production of documents where the stated grolin~
for privilege is upheld by the court." The leading Canadian case setting faiUi
the criteria for the exercise of the court's discretion in this respect is SlavutYtJi
v. Bakers? There, citing Wigmore on Evidence.v Spence 1. listed the fO:~l1
following conditions as essential to the establishment of a privilege Oottie
disclosure of communications:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not;iJ~
disclosed..,'
(2) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfact~iy
maintenance of the relation between theparties.;,~,
(3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ougHt
to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure oftlfe
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained fortlie
correct disposal ofthe litigation.4 .;{':.
Three distinct forms of privilege have been held to conform to these criteria~
First, protection has traditionally been accorded to communications made.b~
a client to a solicitor to obtain legal advice.P Generally accepted as essential
to the candour upon which full and frank legal advice depends, the ultimat~
aim of this "solicitor-client privilege" is the meaningful protection of the legM.
rights of all - as opposed to the rights only of professional lawyers.w .r..
Second, the "lawyer's brief rule" (or attorney's work product privilege) protec
information generated by either party in anticipation of contemplated '
40. Ibid.,Rule 31.10(1).
41. Ibid., Rules 30.02(2), 30.03(2)(b), 30.06.
42. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 224 (S.C.C.), [hereinafter Slavutych]. For a recent U.S. decision in .
which the court adopted the identical set of criteria, see Ott v. St. LukeHosp., 522 F. Supp.:,.
706 (E.D. Ky. 1981). .:y
43. John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at CommonLaw, Vol. 8, 3d ed. (McNaughton ReV17
sion)(196l), p. 527, para. 2285. . 'c:
44. Slavutych, supra,note 42 at 228 [emphasis inoriginal].r
45. See, e.g., R. v. Littlechild (1980), 108 D.L.R. (3d) 340 (Alta. C.A.).}
46. See, e.g., the dicta of Jessel M.R. in Andersonv. Bank ofBritish Columbia (1876), 2 Ch. D;~;
644 at649.''{
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::'pending Iirigation." The purpose of the r~e i~ twofold: to deter ':free-riders"
b'that appropnate incentives can be mamtamed for the creation of such~bfonnation48 and to guard against the distortion of this information by a party
ldverse in interest to the client who commissions it.49In a broader sense, though,
fbelawyer's brief rule expresses an underlying framework of property rights
;'infonnation, providing that the party who takes the initiative to acquire certain
tMonnation should not be required to share it with an adversary, unless
doinpelling reasons dictate otherwise.v
'~Finally, although less well-established than solicitor-client privilege or the
1~er's brief rule, privilege is occasionally granted where the court concludes
tllatthe public interest supporting confidentiality exceeds the competing public
ihterest in the proper administration of justice." On this basis, a recent British
Golumbia malpractice casev extended the law of privilege to the defendant
Jf6spital credentials committee's investigation into the suitability of the defendant
a6ctor to become or remain a member of the staff, concluding that "the general
~ublic interest" in patient protection against substandard practice required
iiuninhibited full disclosure without collateral considerations,"53 whereas impair-
{Dent to the plaintiff's case was slight given the availability of hospital charts
iod records, and expert medical testimony to establish the appropriate standard
!if care.54 An earlier American case adopted a similar rationale, commenting
6nthe "overwhelming public interest in having ... staff meetings held on a
~onfidential basis so that the flow of ideas and advice can continue," and
~6ncluding that
\ [c]onfidentiality is essential to effective functioning of these staff meetings; and
.- these staff meetings are essential to the continued improvement in the care' and
t treatment of patients. Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices
l;'
t.47.See, e.g., RulesofCivilProcedure, supra,note 35, Rule 31.10(1). For a concise review of the
)l· development of the rule, see Vernon v. North York BoardofEducation (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 613
... (H.C.).
'48. See, e.g., the dictaof Justice Jackson in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) [hereinafter
t Hickman]. See also Steeves v. Rapanos(1982),140 DLR. (2d) 121 (B.C.S.C.).
,.49. See, e.g., the dicta of Jackett P. in Susan Hosiery Ltd v, MN.R., [1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 27 at 34.
·~O. The exception has been articulated by Justice Murphy in Hickman, supra,note 48, as follows:
,(' "Where relevant and nonprivileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where pro-
,~, duction of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case discovery may properly be
JO: had." Thus, for example, "production might be justified where the witnesses are no longer
5 available or can be reached only with difficulty."
~[ See, e.g., the dicta of Thurlow J. in Blaisv. Andras (1972), 30 DLR. (3d) 287 at 292 (F.CA)
/., [hereinafter Blais], ruling there that the test for protection had not been met.
52~Smith v. RoyalColumbian Hospital (1981), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (B.C.S.C.) [hereinafter
\ Smith].
~3.; Ibid.at 726-27.
54.Ibid. at 728.
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is a sine qua non of adequate hospital care. To subject these discussionsandf:;
deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional necessitY,'"
would result in terminating such deliberations. Constructive professional criticisnit
cannot occur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will:'
be used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit.55
While courts have occasionally employed both the lawyer:s brief rule:~~a
the public interest test to block disclosure of QA and RM information,56tWo
developments in the law of privilege have frustrated their general applicatibn
in Canadian medical malpractice cases. First, most Canadian courts h~ve
adopted the "dominant purpose" test articulated by the House of Lords.i? whicH
applies the lawyer's brief rule only where the dominant purpose of the creatltin
of the information in question is the prospect of impending Iitigation,se This
notes Robertson, has eliminated the privilege once enjoyed by incident repd~
and hospital accident reports.t? Since the dominant purposes of peer revi~w
and medical audit procedures are the enhancement of medical quality-aii
management of medical risks, information so generated does not fall wiilim
the narrow rule of the attorney's work product privilege.s? '''1
Second, in spite of occasional judicial statements to the contraryy! COmIllon
law courts have resisted the adoption of a general rule that would ext6~a
evidentiary privilege to documents and communication on the ground that pliblic
safety requires candour and completeness of accident reports, which migh~~~e
lacking in the absence of such protection. To begin with, the jUdiciary,qges
-.''i
55. Bredice v, DoctorsHosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 CO:cJ
Cir. 1973), [hereinafter Bredice]. '\'~
56. See, e.g. Smith,supra,note 52; Bredice, supra,note 55; Gillman v. United States, 53 FRD:j>l'
(D.C.N.Y. 1971), [hereinafter Gillman]; Oviattv. ArchbishopBergan Mercy Hosp., 191 Neb:
224,214 N.W. 2d 490 (1974), [hereinafter Oviatt]. See also the discussion in Gerald Robe,
son, "Doctrinal Developments in Canadian Health Care Liability, 1975-1988" (July 1988):
Research Paper for the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensa .
Issues in Health Care at 57-59.
57. Waugh v. British RailwaysBoard, [1980] A.C. 521 (HL) [hereinafter Waugh].
58. See, e.g., McCaig v. Trentowsky (1983), 148 DLR. (3d) 724 (N.B.C.A.); Voth Bros. v.No "
Vancouver Board ofSchool Trustees (1981), 23 C.P.C. 276 (H.C.c.A.). .i~'
59. Robertson, supra,note 56 at 58. 'L
60. See, e.g., Dufault v. Stevens (1978), 86 D.L.R. (3d) 671 (H.C.C.A.); Fiege v. Cornwall Ge~:
Hospital (1979), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 152 (Ont, H.C.); Laplantev. Matsqui-Sumas-Abottsford ts:
General Hospital (1980),23 B.C.L.R. 1 (S.C.); Beansv. Shaughnessy Hospital Society(19~~),
49 B.C.L.R. 181 (S.C.). Several American cases have arrived at the same conclusion on the
basis of a rule granting privilege only to material prepared "solely" for litigation. See,e.g.,
Moon v. McKay, 64 A.D. 2d 1022,409 N.Y.S. 2d 305 (1978); Soiferv, Mt. SinaiHosp:,,6'!J,
A.D. 2d 713, 405 N.Y.S. 2d 116 (1978); Kay Laboratories, Inc. v, District Court, 653 P,,~~
721 (Colo. 1982). ").·i
61. See, e.g., Smith,supra,note 52; Bredice, supra,note 55; Gillman, supra,note 56; Ovia!t;S!t
note 56. .\',,:;;
-?~
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=O:Jt: appear to view the public interest in such confidentiality as particularly~~mpelling. In C:0nway v. Rimmerf? for example, Lord Reid dismissed sugges-
tions that "pubhc safety has been endangered by the candour or completeness
if;such reports having been inhibited by the fact that they may have to be
iroduced if the interests of due administration of justice should ever require
roductionat any time."63 Similarly, in Berqwitz/" Craig 1.A.ordered the College~fDental surgeons to produce a report investigating the plaintiff's complaint
againstthe defendant, noting that the College was obliged under statute to review
Uie latter's conduct, and concluding that most participants in the peer review
~rocess would accept that responsib~ityregar~less of the. report's c~nfidential­
iij,65 In fact, some commentators reject assertions that disclosure hinders peer
review on the ground that this, argument "shows little faith or confidence in
organizedmedicine."66 .
jMore generally, the courts are reluctant to expand the categories of privilege
6eyond "very special relationships," such as that of solicitor and client,61 since
itHsbroadly accepted that "[jjustice is better served by candour than by
s~ppression."68 As the United States Supreme court remarked in the celebrated
caseof United States v. Nixon:
-,.;..
"t!.
';':Whatever their origins, these exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence
'ii are not lightly created nor expansively construed for they are in derogation of
'ithe search for the truth.s?
€onsequently, even where disclosure involves a recognized a risk of harm to
p'ublic safety, the courts have generally refused to extend privilege to QA and
~ information.P Thus, for example, while one American case acknowledged
tllat confidentiality would encourage open communication in the process of peer
revIew, it denied privilege on the basis that "on reflection, one might well debate
i;. [1968] A.C. 910 (Il.L.).
63. Ibid. at 941. The House of Lords has reiterated this position more recently in Waugh, supra,
? note 57.
~4. Supra, note 37.
65. Ibid. at 737-38.
66. Holbrook and Dunn, supra, note 3 at 76. See also Goldberg, supra,note 3 at 154-55.
67. F. v. A Psychiatrist, supra, note 37 at 32, per McEachern Cl.S.C.
68; Waugh, supra,note 57, per Lord Edmund-Davies.
69.418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
i7~. See the cases cited at supra,note 37. See also Kenney v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. App. 2d
. 106,63 Cal Rptr. 84 (1967); Gureghian v. Hackensack Hospital, 109 Nl. Super. 143,262 A.
440 (1970); Davison v. St. PaulFire and Marine Insurance Co.,75 Wis. 2d 190,248 N.W.
2d 433 (1977).
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wherein the public interest lies."?' In the final analysis, therefore, most COurts
concur with the following opinion of the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench:'
[I]n cases where an investigation is prompted by circumstances which are or become
the subject matter of litigation, the question of balancing the respective interests
of the community against those of the litigant weighs in favour ofthe latter.i?
Rationalizing Evidentiary Privilege for QA and RM
The growing demand for legislative action to accord to quality assurance and
risk management programs the evidentiary privilege that the courts have denied
challenges the more sanguine conclusions of courts and commentators. In
contrast, representatives of the medical and legal professions concur in their
concern that the delivery of high quality health care is inhibited by the absence
of such protection.P The possibility that proceedings or communications will
be disclosed in civil litigation, it is said, makes medical personnel reluctant to .
serve on RM and QA committees.?" to engage in the free and open exchange
of information and candid evaluation required to identify individuals or areas
of practice that are cause for concern.I> or to institute remedial programs to
improve the quality of health care for all patients."
. While there is no empirical data to verify these claims or to evaluate the
extent to which this reluctance may have adversely affected the quality of health
care exists," it is difficult to dismiss such persistent and widespread concern
as completely unfounded. In addition, the inference that a lack of confidentiality
has impeded quality assurance and risk management is plausible for three
reasons. First, the possible disclosure of a critical evaluation of a fellow
professional will likely exacerbate the typical discomfort already accompanying
peer review. Second, the risk of disclosure may arouse anxiety among committee
participants with respect to their own liability for defamation. Finally, reluctance
to participate in a process that might be employed in malpractice actions against
71. Nazareth Literary and Benevolent lnst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W. 2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1973), [here-
inafter Nazarethl-
72. Finley, supra,note 33 at 51.
73. See the sources cited at supra,notes 6, 13 and 14.
74. National Health Law Committee, "Report to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Bar Asso-
ciation" (1985) at 3; C.C.H.A., "Position on Patient Care Appraisal," supra,note 1 at 2;
O.H.A., "Patient Care Review in Hospitals" supra,note 13 at 1.
75. National Health Law Committee, ibid; O.HA, ibid.; Saskatchewan Working Group, "Memo-
randum", supra,note 13 at 6. See also Smith,supra,note 52; Bredice, supra,note 55.
76. See, e.g., Carol Clemenhagen, "Quality Assurance in Canada - Barriers and Criticisms"
(Nov. 1987) Quality Assurance Quarterly, cited in C.NA Brief;supra,note 14 at 28.
77. The conceptual and practical problems in designing and undertaking such a study make it an
unlikely prospect
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other medical personnel is consistent with a well-documented physician hostility
. toward and distrust of the malpractice system generally." This last, in turn,
reflects a widespread perception among physicians either that courts persistently
misinterpret medical evidence.I? that judicial determinations of liability are
inaccurate and arbitrary.w or that the system as a whole unfairly stigmatizes
individual physicians for essentially unavoidable accidents that in no respect
suggest an overall pattern of poor practice." In this respect, unwillingness to
actively participate in the QA and RM process is yet another manifestation of
the problem of "defensive medicine" that is widely reported to plague the
contemporary medical liability system.P
Although one might arguably challenge the factual basis of physician
perceptions concerning the risk of liability for defamation or the actual extent
to which a malpractice verdict is an arbitrary outcome signifying little or nothing
of the overall pattern of the defendant's practice.f it is impossible to dismiss
these perceptions themselves or their consequences for the effective implemen-
tation of risk management and quality assurance. Nor can one ignore the real
differences between the standards and sanctions applied by professional self-
78. See, e.g., Sara Charles, Jeffrey Wilbert and Eugene Kennedy, "Physicians' Self-Reports of
Reactions to Malpractice Litigation" (1984) 141 Am.J. Psychiatry 563; Sara Charles, Jeffrey
Wilbert and Kevin Franke, "Sued and Nonsued Physicians' Self-Reported Reactions to Mal-
practice Litigation" (1985) 142 Am.J. Psychiatry 437; Sara Charles, Charlene E. Pyskoty,
and Amy Nelson, "Physicians on Trial - Self-Reported Reactions to Malpractice Trials"
(1988) West J. Med. 358. See also Peter Bell, "Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law
of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability" (1984) 35
Syracuse L. Rev. 939.
79. The "most significant" concern identified by the Canadian Council on Hospital Accreditation
is that "the work and recommendations of patient care appraisal committees might be used
unfairly, inappropriately and out of context in a malpractice action against a physician or
hospitaL" C.c.H.A., "Position on Patient Care Appraisal", supra,note 1 at 2.
80. See, e.g., American Medical Society/Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, A Proposed
Alternative to the CivilJustice System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based,
Administrative System(January 1988) at 7-11.
8!. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, LegalPolicy for Medical Injuries (1988), unpublished, at 1-2, 15-17.
82. See, e.g., M.L. Garg, W.A. Gliebe and M.B. Elkhatib, "The Extent of Defensive Medicine:
Some Empirical Evidence" (1978) 6 Leg. Aspects of Med. Practice 25; Stephen Zuckerman,
"Medical Malpractice: Claims, Legal Costs, and the Practice of Defensive Medicine" (1984)r 3 Health Affairs 128; Roger Reynolds, John Rizzo and Martin Gonzalez, "The Cost of Medi-
~. cal Professional Liability" (1987) 257 lA.M.A. 2776. For more skeptical views of this phe-
~ nomenon, see Duke Law Journal Project, "The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of~ Defensive Medicine" (1971) Duke LJ. 939; Nathan Hershey, "The Defensive Practice of
~.... Medicine: Myth or Reality?" (1972) 50 Milbank Mem. Fund Q. 69.
t 83. See, e.g., Patricia Danzon, Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence, and PublicPolicy (Cam-
~. . bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 39-40. See also John Rolph, "Some Statistical
Evidence on Merit Rating in Medical Malpractice Insurance" (1981) 481 Risk & Ins. 247;
Blaine F. Nye and Alfred E. Hofflander, "Experience Rating in Medical Professional Liability
Insurance" (1988) 55 J. Risk & Ins. 150 (arguing that claims experience is sufficiently deter-
minate to permit merit rating of individual physicians' malpractice liability premiums).
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regulatio~ .andt~os~ applicable in a malpra~tice action - differences that mak
the physicians justifiably more apprehensive of the latter. Specifically, whil
quality assurance is conducted by specialized physicians themselves, looks-tO
overall practice patterns and emphasizes education and modification of una2
ceptable practice patterns rather than sanctions, malpractice actions are directe
by an inexpert judiciary, concentrate on a single episode of inferior practic
and entail the profoundly public stigma of professional "negligence."84 Con
sequently, a clear public interest in the delivery of high quality health care app~{
to support some form of protection for communications and proceedings"
quality assurance and risk management committees.
Public Interests and Private Rights
Public interest in patient safety and quality of care is only one factor to b
considered in assessing the case for statutory protection of quality assuranc
and risk management. According to the courts in BlaiS'S and Slavutych,86f.l
example, privilege isjustified only where the benefits of confidentiality outweig
the opposing benefit of disclosure to further the proper administration ofjustic
Although often characterized as a "public interest,"87 the litigant's searchf
information to prove his or her case against an adversary is more appropriatei
conceptualized as the individual interest of the litigant. So conceived, rulestri
discovery and privilege may be translated into the more determinate langmig
of rights.88 Thus, the general rule that discovery of an adverse party mayb~
claimed for information "relating to any matter in issue" in the actions? expresse~
the right of each litigant to bring to the attention of the court all facts tha.·
are pertinent to the outcome of the lawsuit - a right that is limited only whet"
· ;~~
84. Thus, as an official of the Canadian Medical Protective Association explains: "negligence.iI
carelessness ... which courts deal with is not at all the same thing as incompetence or pro-
fessional misconduct Negligence may, in a few instances, arise from incompetence. But, m
often the doctors who are found negligent in connection with one of their cases are not
incompetent" Remarks of Dr. Stuart Lee, cited in Brian Goldman, "Quality assurance will?'
play key role in reducing malpractice suits: CMPA" (1987) 137 C.M.A.1. 447 at 448. See als
Council on Medical Service, "Guidelines for Quality Assurance", supra, note 20.
85. Supra, note 51.
86. Supra,note 42. ..
87. See, e.g., Blais, supra, note 51; Nazareth, supra,note 71; Southwick and Slee, supra, note 9,a
379. . .•
88. This, of course, assumes that rights discourse can be determinate - a claim that is reject
by the Critical Legal Studies movement See, e.g., A.C. Hutchinson and P.1. Monahan, "La-
Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thoug ..
(1984) 36 Stan. L.R. 199. For a convincing defence of determinacy and an articulation ofthe
sense in which the term is employed here, see Ernest Weinrib, "Legal Formalism" (1988) ~1
Yale LJ. 949 at 1008-12. ..~
89. See.supra, note 35 and accompanying text.
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"'~~aIIlounts to harassment of the opponent'" or draws third parties into the dispute
fexcept when "there is reason to believe" that the third party "has information
'relevantto a material issue in the action")." Conceptually prior to the recognition
.Sfany form of privilege, this right can be interpreted broadly as a right of access
~ojustice.. . . . .. .
,S-Solicitor-client pnvilege does not challenge this baSIC nght, but Imparts to
ita notion of equality by ensuring that those without a professional knowledge
,itthe law will nevertheless retain the right of access to justice." Similarly,
:*hile the lawyer's brief rule abandons equality in favour of an alternative notion
.ofproperty rights recognizing the private efforts ofeach litigant in the production
6f information,93 it nevertheless acknowledges the superiority of each litigant's
iight of access to justice by admitting an exception to the general rule where
:production"is essential to the preparation of one's case."94
t;,The third branch of the law of privilege, on the other hand, imperils each
..'tigant's basic right of access to justice by ignoring this rights framework
aItogether. Prohibiting discovery whenever the societal benefits ofconfidentiality
~xceed the foregone advantages of a correct disposal of the litigationj" the
.fuanifestly utilitarian form of this rule contradicts the principles of individual
~ghts upon which the private law is based.w By threatening to place a plaintiff's
ability to prove a defendant's liability completely beyond reach, this rule may,
By procedural fiat, abrogate the substantive rights that the legal system initially
purports to recognize.?"As a result, it is hardly surprising that this branch of
the law of privilege remains poorly established'" and that few courts have found
·;the public interest in patient safety and quality of care to exceed the plaintiffs
<:;)~.
';90. See, e.g., Peter Kiewit Sons v. British Columbia Hydroand Power Authority(1982), 134 D.L.R.
_ (3d) 154 (ReS.C.).
.:!}1. Supra, note 40 and accompanying text
,,92. See supra,note 46 and accompanying text
93. See supra,note 50 and accompanying text
·94. Hickman, supra,note 48. See also supra,note 50.
~95; See Slavutych, supra,note 44; Blais, supra,note 51.
6. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra,note 88. For an attempt to elaborate these principles in the context
{' of medical liability, see David G. Duff, "The Private Law of Medical Malpractice" (1988)
.y [unpublished].
~.7,As Goldberg remarks: "It makes little sense to create a cause of action and then, by creating
i a privilege, destroy the means of establishing it." Goldberg, supra,note 3 at 159. See also
" Southwick and Slee, supra,note 9 at 378.
~g. Supra, notes 62- 72 and accompanying text
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interest in the correct disposal of the malpractice action.P? Courts and legislatui~s
would do well to eschew any acknowledgement of the rule altogether.I00:r,>
Designing a Statutory Rule
T~e. analysis of the previous two sections supports some form ?f e~identia.~
privilege for the RMand QA process,'?' but concludes that any legislative refo"
should observe a framework of individual rights which confers primary status
upon the basic right of each litigant to access to justice.102 This section explores
the implications of this conclusion for the design of a specific statutory rule. j
. . t::
PRESERVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Effective quality assurance and risk management demand the creation of several
types of information of potential interest to the plaintiff in a malpractice action.
These include input standards for hospital equipment and personnel, QA criteri~
to assess quality of care, factual accounts of the adverse outcome, incident6t
occurrence reports in the form of a medical audit or utilization revi~W
investigating and commenting upon the causes of the injury, evaluations oflli~
overall practice patterns of defendant physicians, RM information on high-rir
practice areas and details of risk management efforts to minimize these risks',
While no plaintiff should require discovery of all this material to establish ,~~
allegation of medical malpractice, some plaintiffs may be unable to prove sucR
a claim without access to some QA and RM information. A1
Specifically, in a malpractice claim against an individual physician, the plaintiff
must have access to factual information on the status of his or her physic~L
condition (both pre- and post-injury) and on the procedures employed ili~
.~-I·
·i_\
99. See, e.g., the cases cited at supra, notes 33, 37, 70 and 71. On the other hand, see the cases,·~f
cited at supra, note 61. . __
100. This is not to suggest that utilitarian considerations are irrelevant to the formulation of publi¢:,_
policy with respect to patient safety and quality of care, nor that the private law should be-<-r
regarded as the only means of compensating the victims of medical malpractice. On the conc~
trary, I have argued elsewhere that the existing malpractice system functions poorly from tli~;.
perspectives of both compensation and deterrence, and that these policy goals would be bet"\_,
ter achieved through the development of alternative legal instruments. See David G. Duff, -"-J
"Compensation for Medical Injuries: A Legal and Economic Analysis" (January 1989) - :~,::­
Research Paper for the Federal/Provincial/Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation
Issues in Health Care. See also Weiler,supra, note 81 at 113-68, 221-86. Nevertheless, a rule,.
of privilege that disregards private rights to further the public interest in hospital qua!ity -i'cC
assurance and risk management contradicts the norms of the private law of which it IS a P~fl
and fails to offer a reasonable quid pro quo (such as no-fault compensation) to those whos~~.
ability to demonstrate malpractice is precluded by confidentiality. "~,
10I. Supra, notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
102. Supra, notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
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: osis and treatment. Where the fault of a defendant hospital is at issue,
il(pp;aintiff'S case may depend on factual details concerning the utilization ofti~pita1 resources, evidence o~ the defendant's failure to ensure comp~iancewith
'l~blished standards for equipment and personnel or proof of an inadequate~~~titutional response to knowledge of risks made available through the risk
ni~nagement process. 103•W~e the fo~er i.nformati~n ~n the. sequence of
lli~gnosis and tre~tment IS ~plca~y available I~ the patient s m~dlc~l record'P'
~f;access to which the patient IS clearly entitled,ios and which IS therefore
s'i6cifically excluded from protection in most recommendations'ss and in all
@imi.dian jurisdictions recognizing a statutory rule of privilege'P? - documen-
tation of the latter is impossible without some access to material associated
~ih quality assurance and risk management activities. lOS The basic right of
access to justice thus argues for a significant range of discoverability.
:On the other hand, although undoubtedly of considerable utility to a
Jiupractice plaintiff, other categories of QA and RM information are not
n&:essary to the preparation of his or her case. In particular, this is true of detailed
criteriafor the process of QA assessment, incident reports determining the cause
ofliatrogenic injury and peer review evaluating a defendant physician's overall
pr~ctice pattern. While quality assurance criteria might serve as a convenient
refbrence for evidence of customary practice, absent a "conspiracy of silence"
Wrlong medical practitioners, this information can be obtained from the testimony
ofii::xpert witnesses called on the plaintiff's behalf.P? Consequently, discovery
I:dpresents a form of "free-riding" by plaintiffs and their attorneys. Similarly,
}-.
r:"'.103. For an explanation of the various grounds of hospital liability, see the sources cited at supra,
s : note 4. See also the discussion of the impact of evidentiary privilege on hospital liability in
.. i"~ Goldberg, supra,note 3 at 161-66.
194.. In fact, Ontario regulations mandate the compilation of this information in the patient's medi-
~IJ"cal record. RR.O. 1980, Reg. 865, s. 38(1).
. 05. See, e.g., Harold L. Hirsh, "Medical Records: Medicolegal Balm or Bomb?" (1987) 6 Med
'- Law 525 at 526-28; Maureen Fiorini, Gary Trotter and Anthony Galea, "Production of clini-
'\ cal notes in personal injury litigation in Ontario" (1988) 138 C.MAJ, 513.
196. The C.B.A. resolution stipulates that "no document forming part of an individual's hospital
~~<! .medical record is intended nor can be sheltered under this exemption." C.B.A. Resolution,
:i" supra, note 10. See also O.H.A., "Patient Care Review in Hospitals", supra,note 13 at 2.
Q7. See Evidence Act,RS.M. 1970, c. E-150, s. 11(4); Evidence Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-21, s. 9(4);
- Evidence Act,R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 116, s. 57(3); Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 94, s. 56A(3) [as
.~..... am. 1987]. See also Bill 23, An Act to Amend the Evidence Act, New Brunswick, 36 Eliz. 11,
:-.; 1987, s. 43.3(3)(b).
Q8;, Goldberg, supra,note 3 at 167; Southwick and Slee, supra,note 9 at 378.
Op.,S.outhwick and Slee, supra,note 9 at 3 80. While the possibility of an effective conspiracy of
;:', silence was considerable when medical malpractice was evaluated according to the standards
<;;ofcustomary practice in the locality of the defendant (liability could not be established unless
.;,-an expert witness from the same community testified against the defendant), judicial aban-
} donment of this "locality rule" makes such a result far less likely. Indeed, despite occasional
':' references to such a "conspiracy", there is little evidence that the problem remains. For a
{ brief review of the rise and fall of the locality rule, see Duff, supra,note 4 at 22-26.
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as the Saskatchewan Working Group observes, as long as patients are entitlfiI
to their medical records - and provided these are legislatively required to Contam
factual documentation of all adverse incidents I 10 - production of occurrence
reports allows the plaintiff to "'freeload' upon the work of a quality assurance
committee."lll Finally, although the conclusions of a peer review committee
might be used to damage a defendant physician's credibility and to suggestta
consistent pattern of poor medical practice, these matters are peripheral to the
central issue of whether the defendant was at fault in the particular actio6s
that are the subject of the lawsuit.U? In this respect, moreover, their admissibility,
threatens to divert the court's attention from its proper task, thereby sUbstantiatiJig
physician apprehension of misinterpretation and judicial arbitrariness. I13 , "
Despite the absence of a basic evidentiary right of plaintiffs to QA criteri~
occurrence reports and peer review, the very principle of a basic right of acce~~
to justice argues for strict limits on the scope of evidentiary privilege for th~
quality assurance and risk management process. Consequently, any staMor]
reform should recognize only clearly defined exceptions to a general ruleo'
disclosure, instead ofa general scheme of protection qualified by narrow instanc~
of discoverability,'!" In this respect, contemporary Canadian legislation appe~
to be inexcusably overbroad. In each province where a statutory rule of privilege
is in force or before the legislature, protection is extended to broadly define\!
"committees ... for the purpose of studying or evaluating medical practide
in a hospital,"lls while narrow exceptions are provided for medical records
alone. 116 As a result, evidence that is essential to a malpractice claim again~t
'If
110. See, e.g., College of Physicians & Surgeons of Saskatchewan, "Response to the Discussion:;'
Paper Prepared by the Working Group Respecting Quality Assurance Processes and the Sas-:'
katchewan Evidence Act" (1985) at 4. __
Ill. Saskatchewan Working Group, "Memorandum", supra,note 13 at 3. As Craig l.A. observed.']
in Berqwitz, supra, note 37 at 737-38, this evidence would be useful to plaintiffs both in prov~':
ing fault and in assessing their prospects for success prior to the initiation of litigation. --
112. See, e.g, Smith,supra,note 52 at728.;
113. See supra,notes 79-80, and accompanying text. 4
114. In addition to the fairness of such a rule in preserving plaintiffs' basic rights of access tojus-t~
tice, this approach affords greater certainty of confidentiality for information falling within\!
the protected categories than does a general rule of privilege allowing discovery on a case-bY~
case basis where the information is "essential 10 provetheplaintiff'scase(or defendant's:~
defense) or to prove a necessary element of the plaintiffs case or the defendant's defense.",?
Southwick and Slee, supra,note 9 at 379-380 [emphasis in original]. By withholding an ahsi?-
lute guarantee of confidentiality for any category of QA or RM information, the latter')..
approach may do little to assuage the current reluctance of medical personnel to actively par,~
ticipate in quality assurance and risk management programs. :i'
115. See Evidence Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-150, s. 11(2); Evidence Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-21, s. 9(2);,';'
Evidence Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 94, s. 56A(2) [as am. 1987]. Similar language appears in Evi-;I
denceAct, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 116,s. 57( 1); Bill 23, An Act to Amend theEvidence Act,New .
Brunswick, 36 Eliz.ll, 1987, s. 43.3(2).
116. Supra,note 107.
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d-hospital may remai~ privile~ed by t~e operat~on of the s~atute. A d.istinctclass
-oLplaintiff. therefore, 1S effectively stnpped of 1tS substantive legal rights.'!"
';~:..- . .
,,",;
RUBLIC INFORMATION AND THE LAW OF PRIVILEGE
.".~ .
~e an earlier section identified a public interest in evidentiary privilege for
th~:quality assurance and risk management process.!'! and the previous
S'iibsection found no basic plaintiff right to QA criteria, occurrence reports and
pe~r review,1\ 9 active protection of this information has yet to be justified in
tri@sof the rights framework delineated above.l-? In fact, an alternative
aigumentfavouring disclosure asserts that since the hospital is a publicinstitution,
andsince quality assurance and risk management are public duties, malpractice
laintiffs should have an unrestricted right of discovery over the resulting public
ilif~rmation.121
"~fuitially, this conclusion seems compelling. The contrast between the public
P.4rPose of qua.li.ty ~ssurance and risk ~anagement programs an~ the.private
oDjectives of litigation makes any facile analogy to the lawyer s bnef rule
iitappropriate. Nevertheless, a more developed notion of rights to information
m~y support a rule of confidentiality where basic rights of access to justice
iemain undisturbed.
:!tfie definition of QA and RM as "public" duties obscures as much as it
illuminates. In evaluating the claim for privilege, the essential question concerns
tllepurpose of the public duty. Clearly, this is not primarily to furnish plaintiffs
With expert testimony with which they may readily demonstrate the defendant's
f~ult, impeach the credibility of opposing arguments or assess the prospects
o~:~Ontemplated litigation. On the contrary, the primary objectives of quality
~ssurance and risk management are to improve the quality of medical care and
tb:~nhance patient safety. Where confidentiality can be demonstrated to serve
tl1~se goals without violating basic rights of access to justice, therefore, the public
mterestmay legitimately sustain a statutory rule of privilege.
t;;The implications of this conclusion for statutory design are threefold. First,
tije legislation should stipulate that it applies only to communications of and
~i:pceedings before committees charged with the task of risk management or
"( : ':
~1":·
t· s·~.J.;,." .
iJ.7,~"-This result has obvious constitutional implications with respect to the equality provisions of
.":the <:hart~r. I leave to constitutional lawyers the task of marshalling these arguments in con-
,~for~l1ty With the applicable legal doctrine. For a brief survey of American cases challenging
:,;Iegtslated privilege as violating principles of equal protection and due process, see Southwick
.~,·,and Slee, supra, note 9 at 359-60.
i M:Supra,notes 73-84 and accompanying text
9,;/Supra, notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
Q,Supra, notes 88-100 and accompanying text
liSee, e.g., Craig J.A.'s decision in Berqwitz, supra,notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
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quality assurance.u- Such committee participants should not be accorded~
general protection against appearingas witnesses and answering questions baS€ij
on their professional opinions or concerning their knowledge of facts at issUe
in a legalproceeding.'
Second, statutory protection should not extend to proceedings before?ii
professional disciplinary body, hospital credentials committee or hospital accred_
itation authority.P" While strict confidentiality here might be expected'tt
encourage physician participation on QA-and RM committees, as well as candou'
and self-criticism in their analyses.P' an extensive rule of this sort would
undermine its init~al purpose :-vhich is to en.hance ~a~ie~t safeguards and qua1i~
of care.125 The ultimate sanction of professional discipline or the loss of hospitiii
privileges is an essential part of the process of quality assurance and canntit
be excised without causing injury to the entire project.P" In any event, sinc~
resistance to the effective implementation of quality assurance and risR
management programs appears to originate primarily in physician anxiety abaci
its implications for the medical malpractice environment.P? the marginal impa~t
of such sweeping protection is probably slight. .:il'
l22. See, e.g., Evidence Act, RS.M. 1970, c. E-150, s. 11(5);Evidence Act, RS.A. 1980, c. A-2l,
9(5); Evidence Act, RS.B.C. 1979, c. 116, s. 57(2); Evidence Act, RS.N.S. 1967, c. 94, s.
56A(4) [as am. 1987]. See also Bill 23, An Act to Amend the Evidence Act, New Brunswick.'
36 Eliz. II, 1987, s.43.3(5)..,
l23. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Working Group,"Memorandum", supra, note 13 at 5; Evidence Act;
RS.B.C. 1979, c. 116, s. 57(1), which expressly rules out evidentiary privilege in "a procee
ing before a board or body connected with an organization of health care professionals,by
way of a hearing or appeal respecting the conduct or competence of a member of the profe;
sion represented by the organization of health care professionals." Of those Canadian juris-
dictions which have adopted a statutory rule of privilege, British Columbia is alone in'
restricting its application before professional disciplinary bodies. See, e.g., Evidence Act, .
RS.M. 1970, c. E-150, s. 11(6)(a); Evidence Act, RS.A. 1980, c. A-21, s. 9(1); Evidence Act,
RS.N.S. 1967, c. 94, s. 56A(1)(a) [as am. 1987]. :,'
l24. See, e.g., Saskatchewan Medical Association, "Brief to The Federal/Provincial/Territorial."
Review of Liability and Compensation Issue in Health Care" (June 1988) at 2. . J~
125. It must be remembered that candour alone is not the objective of peer review, but instead
serves as a means to the ultimate end of quality assurance.
126. See, e.g., Southwick and Slee, supra,note 9 at 348, commenting that "disclosure of quality:;'
assurance records and reports to in-house personnel is a necessary part of the quality assur-
ance function." The same may be said of the process of professional self-discipline. Indee~
Ontario's PublicHospitals Act,RS.O. 1980. c. 410, s. 30, imposes affirmative obligations0!l
hospital administrators to "prepare and forward a detailed report to the College of Physicia,rs
and Surgeons" where "(a) the application of a physician for appointment or reappointrnel!~to
a medical staff of a hospital is rejected by reason of his incompetence,negligence or rnisconl
duct; (b) the privileges of a member of the medical staff of a hospital are restricted or can-f
celled by reason of incompetence, negligence or misconduct; or (c) a physician voluntari1y;~~
involuntarily resigns from a medical staff of a hospital during the course of an investigati0l~
into his competence, negligence orconduct.", 'i
127. See supra,notes 78-82. :'6
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:Pinally, protection need apply only to QA criteria, incident reports and peer
.:view as opposed to the entire quality assurance and risk management~cess.128 Advocates of legislative reform typically emphasize the reluctant
'ai-ticipation of individual physicians on RM and QA committees and the
,Widespread c~n~em among phy~icians that.revie~ procedures not be employed
-'to impugn indIvIdual colleagues In malpractice actions, But, as the Saskatchewan
~lJnion of Nurses points out, quality assurance programs "are not limited to 'peer'
'reviews of individual performance."129 Rather,
~·0:·
'~f'~'Audits and problem identification studies, if performed professionally, follow
"'i::definedguidelines and are general in nature such that they point more to 'systems'
)i,problems, as opposed to individual performance problems.P?
. P:r.-,,,.
While information on such systemic performance problems could be central
-fO:a malpractice claim directed at an allegedly negligent hospital, it is largely
'fi!elevant to a lawsuit against an individual physician.. Since it is unlikely to
:C'ontain critical evaluations of individual colleagues or to contribute to their
ltigmatization in medical malpractice actions, the possibility of its subsequent
aisclosure is unlikely to dissuade individual physicians from active participation
bn the RM and QA committees. On the other hand, given the implications of
aisclosure for the organizational liability of health care providers, it is possible
ili~t such a prospect might dissuade hospital boards from instituting strong quality
issurance and risk management programs. Nevertheless, since this reaction is
both easier to identify and less destructive than the diffuse opposition of
'hdividual medical personnel, compliance can probably be induced through the
tOinbinedeffect of public regulation and the threat of civil liability itself 131
f):'wo final issues merit some briefdiscussion. First, two factors support a provision
~~stricting any privilege to malpractice actions alone: 132 1) identification of
12:( This argument merely presents further justification for the conclusion arrived at in the pre-
;A' vious section on the basis of the more fundamental right of access to justice. See supra, notes
.;,\103-17and accompanying text. .
I~?;.Saskatchewan Nurses Association, "Brief in Response to the Working Group Respecting the
;':l:QualityAssurance Process and the Saskatchewan Evidence Act" (9 February 1988) at 2.
30. Ibid. at 6. In a similar vein; Southwick and Slee distinguish between the "procedural" and the
," "substantive" aspects of quality assurance programs, noting that information of the former
1.va~ety must be disclosed to maintain accreditation status, to resolve litigation alleging insti-
"<f tUllonalliability, antitrust activities or wrongful denial of hospital privileges, and to demon-
~:;strate compliance with government regulations. Southwick and Slee, supra, note 9 at 347.
Bll. See sources cited at supra,note 4.
31,See, e.g., Saskatchewan Working Group, "Memorandum", supra, note 13 at 5.
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medical malpractice as the source of most physician anxiety responsible fi
impeding QA and RM,133 and 2) recognition of additional rights of accesscl'
information to permit either informed public debate about questions of cost aIi~
quality in the delivery of health care,134 a physician to appeal a denial ofhospitil1
privilegesl-" or a union member to grieve a disciplinary action in a labcitiF
arbitration proceeding.Ps While most American states provide for an exceptio~
to the general rule of privilege by allowing physicians access to peer reviex",
records .to ~hallenge staff denials, 137 l~ttle regard is ~evoted to the equally'
compelling interests of the general public and non-medical personnel in acc(:~s
to _privilegedinformation."
Second, participants in the quality assurance and risk management proce-S-s
-:- whe.ther w~tnes~es or committee ~em?e.r~ - should be granted statutci~
immumty against libel or slander actions initiated by those who are criticized
through the process of peer review.138 Nevertheless, this immunity should:6e
restricted to those acting in good faith.P? with the obligation on the complaimirit
to demonstrate the absence of such good faith. 140 .,k
.}:l
Conclusions
Patient safety and high quality medical care are important policy objectiV"fs
that deserve legal encouragement. In the current context, this entails some
measure ofstatutory protection for information generated in the course ofhospit~l
quality assurance and risk management programs.l-' Nevertheless, a balance-d
approach requires that this objective not overwhelm the competing rights·tif
injured patients, hospital personnel (medical and non-medical) and the gene~~
"CL
133. Supra,notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
134. Saskatchewan Nurses Association, supra,note 129 at 5.
135. Goldberg, supra,note 3 at 155.
136. Ibid. at 7. .
137. See, e.g., Alaska Stat., s. 18.23.030 (1981); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann., s. 36-445.01A (Supp. 198
Cal. Evid. Code, s. 1157 (West Supp. 1984); Colo. Rev. Stat., s. 12-43.5-102(3)(e) (1978);·.
Hawaii Rev. Stat., s. 624-25.5 (Supp. 1983); Indiana Code Ann., s. 34-4-12.6-2(b) (Supp.,
1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann., 311.377(6) (1983); Or. Rev. Stat., s. 41.675(5) (1984); Wash.Re~
Code Ann., s. 4.24.250 (West Supp. 1983). ~
138. See, e.g., Evidence Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. A-21, s. 9(6); Evidence Act, R.S.M. 1970, c. E-150,s'"
12; Public Hospitals Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 410, s. 10: "No member of a committee of a hospit~
or of the board or Appeal Board of the staff thereof and no witness in a proceeding or inv~,
tigation before such committee or board is liable for anything done or said in good faith iIi'.
the course of a meeting, proceeding, investigation or other business of the committee or i~.
board." '.:;
139. Neither Alberta nor Manitoba have adopted such a provision. Ibid. ':~
140. See, e.g., Evidence Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 116;s. 57(4) [as am. 1986]; Evidence Act, R.S.N.S~:'
1967, c. 94, s. 56B [as am. 1987, c. 20]; The Medical Profession Ac~ 1981,S.S. 1980c81,l:tM
10.1, s. 60(1). ' ,
141. Supra, notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
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,"blic to broad categories of QA and RM information.I'< As a result, several~!lndusions for the design of a statutory rule ofprivilege for the quality assurance.1~driskmanagement process necessarily follow.~.First,privilege should be acknowledged only in the limited areas ofQA criteria,
'.':'ccurrence reports and peer review. 143 Otherwise, legislation should provide for'~~'general rule of dis~overability.Secon~, patients sh~uld retain the right to their
fuedical records, WhICh should be required to contam a factual account of any
~dverse incident.144 Similarly, plaintiffs and the public should retain a right of
1fccess to general systemic or procedural information so that institutional
fueasures to improve quality and enhance patient safety can be externally
:~valuated.145Third, evidentiary privilege should be recognized only in the context
6f malpractice actions.Pf In particular, no protection should apply before
lj'rofessional disciplinary bodies, hospital credentials committees or hospital
~~creditation authorities.P" Finally, participants in the QA and RM process
should be accorded full immunity from libel or slander liability, provided that
they have acted in good faith, with the onus of proving bad faith resting upon
The party alleging defamation.t"
{While legislation along these lines might still fail to secure enthusiastic
p'articipation in quality assurance and risk management programs, it is likely
fo have some positive effect since it specifies the most sensitive categories of
iliformation as privileged. Regardless, such a rule provides the greatest sphere
6fconfidentiality that is consistent with the competing rights of patients who
lite the unfortunate victims of malpractice that quality assurance and risk
~anagement fail to prevent. In this respect, any continued professional reluctance
tp.take part in QA and RM programs would be attributable not to a lack of
further evidentiary privilege, but to the inherent limitations of professional self-
1~2. Supra, notes 85-100, 132-37 and accompanying text.
11~· Supra, notes 109-13, 128-31 and accompanying text.
14!t Supra, notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
45. Supra, note 133 and accompanying text. Although lacking in existing Canadian legislation,
D such a provision could be patterned on a section in the British Columbia statute permitting
";. disclosure of information to advance medical research or medical education "in a manner
('::that the disclosure or publication precludes the identification in any manner of the persons
.1. whose condition or treatment has been studied, evaluated or investigated." Evidence Act,
;'RS.B.C. 1979, c. 116, s. 57(5)(c) [as am. 1986].
!t§LSupra, notes 123-27, 132-36 and accompanying text.
!t1.;Supra, notes 123-27 and accompanying text.
i1~~ Supra, notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
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regulation.P? or to the civil liability regune itself and the defensive medlcaL;l;l
practices that it engenders.P? The resolution of these problems, of course;~
. ., . , ...:.~
involves much more than the law ofevidence.#B
DAVID G. DUFF
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149. See, e.g., Michael J. Trebilcock, "Regulating Service Quality in Professional Markets" in
Donald N. Dewees, ed., The Regulation of Quality(1983) 84; Robert C. Derbeyshire, "How
Effective is Medical Self-Regulation?" (1983) 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 193; Andrew K. Dolan,
and Nicole D. Urban, "The Determinants of the Effectiveness of Medical Disciplinary
Boards: 1960-1977" (1983) 7 Law & Hum. Behav. 203; Gary L. Gaumer, "Regulating Health
Professionals: A Review of the Empirical Literature" (1984) 62 Mil. Mern,Fund Q. 380. ;"
150. Supra, notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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